For many liberals, the institutional 'wall' between state and church is built upon a separation of the public-as-secular from the religious-as-private. 4 Historically, the evolution of the secular public sphere and the concomitant privatisation of religious diversity is said to have contributed to putting an end to the Christian bloodshed in Europe. 5 This may in part explain the contemporary fear of some that religion might 'smuggle' itself back into the public sphere and endanger the 'citadel of the secular state.' 6 But it also points to the paramount importance of liberal neutrality in attempts to justify its enduring exclusion. A secular understanding of the public, or so the argument goes, is justified by virtue of liberal neutrality because it secures a neutral public sphere in which citizens, stripped of their religious differences, can encounter each other as commons. In section two I Walzer, 'Liberalism,' 315. 4
As Walzer himself notes, the distinction between the public-as-secular and the religious-asprivate is but one manifestation of the liberal art of separation alongside, for example, the distinction between public politics and private economic activity, see Walzer, 'Liberalism,' 316. I shall focus on the distinction between the secular and the religious in order to shed some broader light on the way the public-private divide structures liberal politics. argue that this justification of the secular public sphere on grounds of liberal neutrality, while superficially attractive, is not conclusive because the distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere that is constitutive of liberal neutrality cannot be constituted by way of a neutral distinction between the (secular) public and the (religious) private.
My argument suggests that the justification of the liberal public-private divide rests on two distinct claims that are often lumped together: first, that the distinction between a 'public sphere' and a 'private sphere' is a meaningful way to cognize and structure modern pluralistic societies; and secondly, that there is a meaningful way to distinguish what is or ought to be 'public' from what is or ought to be 'private.' Both claims are of course interrelated: to posit something in the private sphere excludes it from the public sphere and such exclusion will appear arbitrary if it cannot be defended on the basis of a convincing delimitation of 'public' and 'private.' In this vein, critics of the liberal public-private divide have contested the distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere because it rests on a partisan understanding of public and private. 7 Europe's (legal) treatment of its Muslim populations is a case in point. Not only does it cast doubts on the veracity of liberal attempts to carve out a protected private sphere of religious activity (instead of simply 'walling off' religious minorities). 8 It also illustrates how the proper role of religion in the secular public sphere is defined with reference to national-majoritarian traditions imbued with Christian values, 9 something perhaps most visible in the diverging treatment by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) of the Muslim headscarf and the Christian crucifix. While the headscarf is portrayed as a 'powerful external symbol' that is 'difficult to reconcile with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, For all its national-majoritarian bias, I caution in section three against dismantling the liberal public-private divide because such strategy risks reinstating the liberal distinction between the 'secular public' and the 'religious private' as a totalistic distinction between 'national members' and 'Muslim non-members' of the polity as a whole. To elaborate this concern, I draw a trajectory from early-modern religious to contemporary nationalistic challenges to state-based liberalism (associated with, respectively, John Locke's treatment of the atheist and John Finnis' treatment of the Muslim) that collapse political community into predestined notions of religious faith and national fate. Against this background, I advance a less ambitious defence of the liberal public-private divide that vindicates the distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere not on grounds of a neutral distinction between the 'public' and the 'private' but instead as a discursive framework for conducting liberal politics. I submit that the proper response to concerns that the 'liberal public' is coterminous with the proverbial white heterosexual Christian male is not to abandon the distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere but to contest majoritarian conceptions of the public that underpin it. On this view that I shall flesh out in the final section, the distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere frames the negotiation of the 'public' and the 'private' between national majorities and religious minorities as members of the same political community.
Laïcité
The French tradition of laïcité is often considered the most principled expression of the liberal art of separation of the secular-as-public from the religious-asprivate. 12 The French nation state assimilates the citoyen to its republican identity, while leaving her free to pursue her religious beliefs as a private individual. This separation of citizens' public and private 'selves' is legally entrenched through laïque state neutrality that purports to react with institutional blindness to the fact of religious and cultural diversity. As Poulter says:
'The principle of secularity (laïcité) is applied with particular fervour in France because the notion of modern citizenship as a status quite separate from distinctive ethnic identities and religious differences has become firmly entrenched in the public mind ever since the days of the Revolution, as corollary of the classical republican principles of equality and fraternity.' 13 The principle of laïcité that commits French public schools to a strictly secular education was challenged in 1989 when three school girls insisted on wearing headscarves in class. The headmaster suspended the girls, claiming to apply a well-established rule of French republicanism prohibiting religious symbols in state schools. In the same year, the Conseil d'État gave a legal opinion holding that while the wearing of religious symbols in public schools was not in itself incompatible with the principle of laïcité, it could be restricted through ministerial decree in case it (among others) interfered with the peaceful running of schools. 14 On this basis, the court reversed a number of school decisions suspending or excluding students who had refused to remove their headscarves. 15 One decade later, on occasion of the publication of the Stasi Report, Jacques Chirac called in a controversial speech for a 'national mobilization in defence of the republic's secular values.' 16 The Stasi Report, after asserting that the principle of laïcité required a complete neutrality of the state in religious matters, had concluded that the headscarf controversy was no longer a matter of 'freedom of conscience' but of 'public order.' 17 It recommended that educational institutions should provide better instruction on the values of republicanism and laïcité, and that 'ostentatious' symbols manifesting a religious affiliation should be banned. In 2004, the French parliament eventually passed a law prohibiting the wearing of any signs manifesting a religious affiliation in public schools. 18 In September 2010, a further law was passed that makes it illegal to wear fullfaced veils anywhere in the public sphere. 19 The report of the French National Assembly in preparation of the 2010 law employs language similar to that of the earlier Stasi Report, associating the veil with 'barbarity,' 'violence,' and the 'subju- gation' of women incompatible with Europe's 'Spirit of Enlightenment.' 20 In October 2010, the Conseil Constitutionnel upheld the constitutionality of the ban without, however, explicitly pronouncing on laïcité. Instead, the Court accepted Parliament's assessment that full-faced veils place women in a situation of exclusion and inferiority incompatible with constitutional principles of liberty and equality. 21 In July 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights joined the view of the French constitutional court. 22 The Strasbourg judges noted that the 2010 law confronts the applicant with a 'dilemma': 'either she complies with the ban and thus refrains from dressing in accordance with her approach to religion; or she refuses to comply and faces criminal sanctions.' 23 Nevertheless, having emphasized (as it always does) 'the State's role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs,' 24 the Court accepted the French government's argument that 'the voluntary and systematic concealment of the face is problematic because it is quite simply incompatible with the fundamental requirements of "living together" in French society.' 25 At first sight, the French ban of religious symbols from the public sphere seems to keep with the promise of liberal neutrality. After all, limits on the exercise of religion are justified by virtue of securing a neutral-as-secular public sphere and guaranteeing the equal protection of religious freedom in the private sphere. However, such an argument overlooks that the laïque public sphere is itself the result of a historical process coined by an interrelation of Christianity and secularization. Accordingly, as Hervieu-Léger notes, ' [i]t is impossible to appreciate the discussion of many questions in French public life which have nothing strictly to do with religion (from food quality to the ethical regulation of science, the management of hierarchical relationships in business, the future of rural society, societal expectations of the state, and demands for workers' rights) without being aware of the extent to which French culture is impregnated with Catholic values.' 26 Laïcité is a non-neutral principle in a twofold sense. Most obviously, while it claims to treat different religious equally it cannot be neutral between religious and secular worldviews as such. ing in a secularized liberal state. Yet my point is that there is no necessary inference from endorsing secularism to the justification of the ban of religious symbols from the public sphere on grounds of liberal neutrality. But laïcité even fails on the weaker claim of neutrality between different religions. Put crudely, French Christian secularists and secularized Christians will find it much easier to accept the public-private divide with its privatization of religious freedom simply because they contributed to its creation in the first place. Laïcité does not require them to change their dress, behaviour and customs regarding the role of religion in the public sphere. 27 And it is, as Modood remarks, surely a contradiction to require both that the secular state should be neutral between religions and that the secular state should require certain religions to renounce their public ambitions. 28 It may be objected that laïcité is at least neutral in the sense that it does not aim at discriminating between different religions, and/or that it does not draw on religious justifications. However, such models of formal or reason-based equality hide as much as they reveal. They cannot determine whether liberal neutrality requires religions to be treated equally in a positive sense (all religions in the public sphere), or equally in a negative sense (all religions out of the public sphere). But surely, this is precisely what is at stake in the contest between 'public' and 'private' religions -which leads right back to the primordial problem of defining what should count as 'public' and 'private' for the purpose of the liberal public-private divide.
Once the veil of liberal neutrality is lifted, two further justifications for decreeing public religions as private divide surface: laïcité as promotion of individual autonomy that lies at the heart of a perfectionist morality; and laïcité as a communitarian ideal that fosters a civic sense of loyalty to a particular historical community. 29 For those who defend the equation of 'secular' and 'public' on grounds of individual autonomy, the ban of religious symbols from the public sphere is justified because it liberates Muslim women from heteronomous social structures that persist in the private sphere -a position enthusiastically endorsed by former French President Sarkozy when advocating the French burqa ban: 'The burqa is not a religious sign. It is a sign of the subjugation, of the submission, of women. (…) We cannot accept in our country women imprisoned behind bars, cut off from social life, deprived of identity.' 30 The blemish of this heroic posture is that it becomes self-defeating once placed in the context of the liberal public-private divide: the autonomy of Muslim women is promoted by excluding them from the autonomous public sphere and forcing them back into the heteronomous private sphere that deprives them of their 'identity.' This entails a categorical denial that Muslim women could embrace the headscarf as an autonomous choice, that is, as This leaves the third and final tenet of laïcité, a communitarian notion of civic loyalty that strives to resurrect a 'traditional Catholic-inspired sociability' in new national clothes. 32 On this view, the ban of religious symbols from the secular public sphere is justified because it inculcates a robust national identity capable of transcending particular religious and cultural loyalties. Stripped of its neutralist pretensions the conversion of believers into citizens works through the imposition of national majoritarian traditions on religious minorities. During the parliamentary debates of the 1994 French law prohibiting the display of religious symbols in public schools, a member of the Assemblée Nationale used his 'bon sens paysan' to elaborate a contemporary interpretation of the traditional French way of transforming (Catholic) 'peasants into Frenchmen': 'Islam has settled rather recently in our country. Its faith is absolutely respectable. But its adherents, as everybody else, must adapt to our values and traditions, not the other way around.' 33 Ultimately, the 'neutrality' and 'autonomy' justifications for excluding religious symbols from the public sphere collapse into this kind of national majoritarianism that betrays the liberal promise not just to assimilate but to transcend religious diversity. 34 National majorities posit the distinction between the secular public sphere and the religious private sphere in order to populate the former and relegate religious minorities to the latter. It is their national and secular and Christian conception of 'public' that directs the neutrality principle towards the exclusion of (certain) religions from the public sphere, as it is their national and secular and Christian conception of 'private' that reduces the political subject behind the veil to a false dichotomy between secular autonomy and sacred heteronomy. On a more analytical plane, the purportedly 'neutral' distinction between the public-as-secular and the religious-as-private displays the public-private divide as both constitutive of and constituted by liberal neutrality. It is constitutive of liberal neutrality in that the division of society into a public sphere and a private sphere demarcates the realm in which liberal neutrality is properly thought to apply. Liberal neutrality thus presupposes the existence of a public sphere as separated from other social spheres defined as private. Yet the public-private divide is also constituted by liberal neutrality in that the latter is thought to provide the justification for a non-arbitrary distinction between the public and the private. This justification of the secular public sphere on grounds of liberal neutrality is not conclusive because liberal neutrality can only apply to the public sphere after a non-neutral distinction between public and private has been put into place. Put differently, the secular public sphere can only be neutral between different religions if and to the extent that all religions have already been demarcated as private.
Our modern atheists
The problem of the non-neutrality of liberal neutrality is everything but new. If, John Locke had argued in his Epistola de Tolerantia of 1689, 'such were the state of things, that the interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle, that had been destroyed by some extraordinary murrain; who sees not that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever? Only it is to be observed, that in this case the law is not made about religion, but about political matter; nor is the sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves thereby prohibited.' 35 However, while the farmer who cannot kill his calf until the stock has been sufficiently increased will merely suffer a temporal economic disadvantage, the religious believer, when not engaging in the rituals required by her faith, will risk her salvation. And it is difficult to see why Locke's proposal should seem equally congenial to both of them. 36 That the law is not made about religion is simply not sufficient to establish its neutrality in relation to religion.
But the problem cuts deeper. As is well known, Locke's defence of religious toleration was not particularly tolerant after all, despite his claim to have drawn a bright-line distinction between the 'business of civil government' and the 'busi- What the majority of British judges did say in Begum was that the decision of Denbigh High School to prohibit Shabina Begum attending school dressed in a jilbab (a long loose-fit overgarment) did not interfere with her right to freedom of religion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) because she could choose to 'compromise and, if necessarily sacrifice' the expression of her beliefs, or to move to another school whose uniform policy would accommodate her religious dress requirements. 46 Moreover, all judges concurred that assuming there had been an interference, it would have been justified because the school's uniform policy pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others by promoting social cohesion and religions harmony among opposing groups. Finnis is right to complain about such 'conceptual slackness of human rights-law-in-action.' 47 That the uniform policy may compel Begum to 'sacrifice' the expression of her religious beliefs is not considered sufficient to bring her case within the ambit of Article 9(1) ECHR. This, in turn, relieves the school from the onus of proving that Begum's exclusion was 'necessary in a democratic society' because responding to a 'pressing social need' as required by Article 9(2) ECHR. 48 This is what Finnis thinks the House of Lords really wanted to say:
'Confronted by the grave warnings thus issuing from courts of great panEuropean authority, citizens of countries whose Muslim population is increasingly very rapidly by immigration and a relatively high birth rate may ask themselves whether it is prudent, or just to the children and grandchildren of everyone in their country, to permit any further migratory increase in that population, or even to accept the presence of immigrant, non-citizen Muslims without deliberating seriously about a possible reversal -humane and financially compensated for and incentivized -of the inflow.' 49
Now clearly, their Lordships could not have said what Finnis thinks they wanted to say after Lord Bingham had found it 'important to stress at the outset that this case concerns a particular pupil in a particular school in a particular place at a particular time.' 50 So let's turn to the 'grave warnings' issued by the European Court of Human Rights. According to Finnis, the outcome of Şahin was predictable after the ECtHR had upheld the ban of the Turkish Refah Party, among others because Refah Partisi had advocated and intended to introduce Islamic law in Turkey. 51 Leyla Şahin, by contrast, only wanted to continue her university education wearing a headscarf. Istanbul University suspended her, a decision that the ECtHR eventually upheld in a split Grand Chamber Judgement. Before the Strasbourg court, the Turkish government did not submit, let alone substantiate, that Ms Şahin was connected to extremist political movements, or that she had ever tried to impose her religious views on others. 52 Which is why the Chamber judges contented themselves with accepting the Turkish Government's view that the headscarf ban was justified as a general 'preventive' measure. 53 The Grand Chamber, after cursorily observing that 'the impugned interference primarily pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order,' considered that it could not 'apply the criterion of proportionality in a way that would make the notion of an institution's "internal rules" devoid of purpose.' 54 Whatever 'warnings' the Strasbourg judges may have wanted to convey, they would be based on very tangible evidence indeed. Judge Tulkens' lone dissent in Şahin rings true: 'only indisputable facts and reasons whose legitimacy is beyond doubt -not mere worries or fears -are capable of (…) justifying interference with a right guaranteed by the Convention. The problem with Finnis' interpretation is that it confuses the Court deferring to the views of the Turkish authorities with the Court endorsing these views. Indeed, the ECtHR's justification for employing a wide margin of appreciation is a far cry from Finnis' contention that the Court could indulge his own view, namely that the 'intimidatory pressures for conformity which are the main ground for the headscarf ban in Turkey and the jilbab ban in Denbigh High School are often (…) early precursors of jihad ': 56 'Where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be given special importance. This will notably be the case when it comes to regulating the wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions, in respect of which the approaches in Europe are diverse. Rules in this sphere will consequently vary from one country to another according to national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order.' 57 In an earlier contribution, John Finnis defended the indefinite detention of (Muslim) non-citizens awaiting deportation on grounds of a Kelsenian notion of the 'legal system's subsiding unity through time [that] cannot be explained without foundational reference to the group whose legal system it is.' 58 The background of the debate was a House of Lords judgment holding that the indefinite detention of foreigners suspected of terrorist activities was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights because it arbitrarily discriminated between UK nationals and UK non-nationals. 59 For Finnis, by contrast, it is precisely the distinction between nationals and aliens that breathes life into the legal community because it endows the 'indispensable framework for articulating, expressing, ratifying, and demanding (…) integration in and assimilation to this nation-state rather than some other': 60 'Here our constitutional law intervenes to remind us that while they are among us, non-members are to be treated as members so far as is compatible with maintaining the core of the distinction between members and nonmembers -between members by right and members by revocable permission. So our justifiable lesser willingness to accept risks from non-members warrants (…) their liability to be removed from the nation's territory and, with a view to and pending that removal, to be kept apart from the community by humane detention or control. However, as Finnis himself realizes, the conferral of citizenship as a legal status does not vouch for membership in the national community. The deeper challenge to constitutional order, he concludes, is 'posed by nationals who regard their nationality as a form of alienage because (…) they believe their true Nation lies altogether beyond -but is ordained to have dominion over -the bounds and territories, and the constitutional principles and rights, that frame and structure our nation's common good.' 62 Locke could not have put it any better. It is ultimately a concern with national membership, not legal citizenship, which motivates Finnis' proposal to prevent any further Muslim migration and reverse the inflow of Muslim immigrants. That we are (sometimes 63 ) legally prevented from deporting Muslim nationals is just a tedious detail in the real debate about whether Muslims can be genuine members of the national community at all.
John Dunn has suggested that Locke's fear of atheism could be considered 'a sort of spiritual equivalent to AIDS in the most hysterical and contemporary understandings.' 64 The atheist's denial of the existence of God reduces the law of nature to the conflictive interests of individuals who, left to their own fallible devices, have no reason to trust each other and hence no capacity to form a peaceful and stable society. Jeremy Waldron has defended Locke's exclusion of 'Mahometans' against liberal critique by arguing that Locke could concede the possibility that not all Muslims yielded blind political obedience to the Ottoman emperor. 65 One question is whether Locke and his contemporaries believed that for a 'Mahometan' to profess himself a faithful subject of the Magistrate could be anything but 'ridiculous' pretence. 66 Another question is whether today's liberal majorities upon whom the 'prospects of survival' of liberal institutions depend have once again come to believe the same. If so, and to invert John Dunn's conclusion, Locke is very alive and liberalism is 'well and truly dead. ' 67 4 The politics of the liberal public-private divide 'concerns exclusions and the desire that those excluded recognize what is included in the name one has chosen for oneself.' 69 Asad is sceptical about the potential of representative democracy to overcome the national-majoritarian bias of the liberal democratic state:
'The ideology of political representation in liberal democracies makes it difficult if not impossible to represent Muslims as Muslims. Why? Because in theory the citizens who constitute a democratic state belong to a class that is defined only by what is common to all its members and its members only. What is common is the abstract equality of individual citizens to one another, so that each counts as one. (…) Involved here is the assumption not only that the whole is authoritative over any of its parts, but that what there is more of has ipso facto greater weight than that which differs from it merely by being less.' 70 In section two, I argued that attempts to justify what is 'common to all members' of the liberal polity on grounds of a neutral distinction between the public-assecular and the religious-as-private are bound to fail because the secular public sphere can only be neutral between different religions if and to the extent that all religions have already been demarcated as private. At the same time, my analysis in section three suggested that it is precisely this purported abstract commonality between citizens in the public sphere that vouches for their political membership in the liberal state irrespective of their 'private' religious loyalties. This is not to suggest that the evolution of the public sphere coincided with the emergence of state-based liberalism. 71 It is only to maintain that within the modern state, the liberal distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere is a manifestation of the relative autonomy of the political subject from predetermined orders of social relations. Different from pre-modern notions of hierarchy and transcendental order that a priori imputed social meaning to the collective, the liberal public sphere emplaces the citizen in a 'community of strangers' bonded by an impersonal solidarity generated through the process of political self-determination whose operative logic remains distinct from the society over which it rules. 72 Accordingly, dismantling the distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere does little to neutralize national-majoritarian conceptions of the 'public' but instead allows them to colonize society in its entirety, thus bereaving religious minorities of their last refuge. The likely result is a reinstatement of the liberal distinction between the 'secular public' and the 'religious private' as a total- istic distinction between 'national members' and 'Muslim non-members' of the polity as a whole. This predicament, in turn, reveals the critical role of the liberal private sphere in securing religious minorities a vested interest in society by allocating them a protected space for the development and expression of values that have not (yet) been recognized by national-majoritarian traditions and cultures. 73 Perhaps needless to say, propositions of the like are routinely discredited on the ground that they allegedly foster the formation of 'secluded communities' that become insulated from the critique of society. More often than not, such allegations build on a comfortable yet incongruous equation of 'society' with 'majority' that nourishes the furore of one (dominant) part of society that another (subordinate) part of society resists the assimilation to cultural norms and practices that, in effect or intention, denigrate and exclude them. Be that as it may, I do not wish to suggest that the liberal public-private divide could or should create a non-permeable and immutable wall of separation between state and society. On the contrary, the liberal distinction between the public sphere and the private sphere provides the discursive framework for negotiating the 'public' and the 'private' between national majorities and religious minorities as members of the same political community.
Asad's insight that European identity demands that those excluded recognize what is included in its own name points to a different, non-numerical and reflexive, understanding of political representation as collective self-identification. 74 On this view, political community is constituted by virtue of a legal act that identifies and empowers individuals as its members. Yet 'this identification/ empowerment only succeeds if individuals retroactively identify themselves as the members of the polity.' 75 It is the representation of the people as a political community (the 'we') that is constitutive of its individuation and legitimized through its reiteration on the part of the real people that come to be re-presented. The re-presented origin of a political community, in turn, explains the precarious and ever-provisional legitimacy of legal ordering which is 'from the very beginning [beset with] the problem of justifying the inclusion and exclusion required for political unity': 76 'For the democratic Rechtsstaat is the form of political organisation that suspends, up to a point, the initial and subsequent closures in view of determining anew what interests are shared by a community and who is an interested party thereto. Moreover, this suspension and redefinition of closure are only possible because the legal order, as posited, does not exhaust the possibilities of political community.' 77 
